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This essay considers the development of the nuclear science programme in Malaysia from a transnational
perspective by examining the interactions between state agents and other external nuclear-knowledge/
technology related actors and agents. Going beyond the model of knowledge diffusion that brings
together concerns articulated in Harris’s (2011) geographies of long distance knowledge and Reinhardt’s
(2011) role of the expert in knowledge transfer, the proposed three-phase model of knowledge transfer
theorises the pathways undertaken by a late-blooming participant of modern science and technology as
the latter moves from epistemic dependency to increasing independence despite the hurdles encoun-
tered, and the underdevelopment of many areas of its technoscientiﬁc economy. The model considers
tensions stemming from the pressures of expediency for meeting national developmental goals on the
one side, and the call to support the objectives of basic science on the other. The three phases of the
model are epistemic transition, epistemic transplantation and localisation, and epistemic generation
(ETTLG). As additional support for the proposed model, three arguments are proffered as deeper ex-
planations of the epistemic goal by using Malaysia as a case study: knowledge transfer for political
legitimization, knowledge transfer for countering agnotology, and knowledge transfer for social engi-
neering and science diplomacy.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the philosophy of science, there are discussions on knowledge
transfer as a form of epistemic translation between science-
theoretical abstract models and closed-system physical/simulated
systems (Humphreys and Imbert (eds.), 2012; Morrison, 2015;
Weisberg, 2013). However, there is not yet a knowledge transfer
model describing the knowledge transfer of open-ended complex
systems at a social-epistemological level, such as that of knowledge
transfer involving polycentres of technoscientiﬁc actions spread
over a longue durée of space and time. The attribution of longue
durée is justiﬁed in terms of the recurrence of recognizable
epistemic patterns even with the translation of that knowledge
over rapidly evolving epistemic or non-epistemic circumstances
(Grote, 2015). The speciﬁcation of the longue durée is applicable to
knowledge societies that have undergone periods of disruptions to,
and ruptures in, their traditions of knowledge, usually because oft, Sunway University, No. 5
l Ehsan, Malaysia.
. L., Nuclear science and tec
ory and Philosophy of Scienccolonialism, thereby resulting in truncated timelines for the
development of intellectual events that would otherwise have had
more time to take root and evolve over a timespan longer than a
mere matter of decades.
At present, most discussions of macroscopic and complex forms
of knowledge transfer in R&D (research and development), inno-
vation, and science and technology studies are taken up, mainly, in
management, policy, geographical, economics, and sociological
studies (Böcher & Krott, 2016; Howlett (ed.), 2011; Lin, 2000; Nilsen
& Anelli, 2016). Moreover, in knowledge transfer systems that
consider the relationship between developed and developing na-
tions, the focus has always been on inter-ﬁrm or inter-
organizational (commercial or otherwise) forms of co-operations
(Goel & Rustagi, 2006; Narteh, 2008). A knowledge transfer
model that takes into account open systems operating across vast
timescales, as well as epistemic, social and geopolitical inequality, is
needed for a systematic and critical accounting of the historical and
sociological development of knowledge systems such as that rep-
resented by the Malaysian nuclear science and technology pro-
gramme discussed here.hnology in the Malaysian context: Three phases of technoscientiﬁc
e (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.10.002
2 There are important philosophical issues pertinent to the topic of applied vis-à-
C.A.L. Lee / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e112Porous and ever-shifting political, economic, and epistemic
boundaries inform the development of Malaysia’s nuclear science
and technology programme. These boundaries are illustrated in
Harris’s (2011) three concepts of knowledge geographies. The ﬁrst
concept concerns static knowledge. In Malaysia’s nuclear case,
static knowledge pertains to agricultural and industrial needs, hy-
drology, medical infrastructures, and the measurement of radio-
active fallouts. The second concept governs “kinematic geography
of movement,” which is represented by the transfer of resources
(from grants-in-aid to books and training manuals), ‘portable’ ex-
perts (Mehos & Moon, 2011), instrumentation (research reactors
and irradiating instruments), and standards for building research
programmes. The third instance is represented by the “dynamics of
travel” involving technical attachments to laboratories, research
institutions or universities abroad; the periodic visits of experts
sent via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), sub-
missions by Malaysia-based scientists to IAEA’s online repository
INIS; and presentations of technical progress at meetings.
However, the transfer of expertise between donor and recipient
produces inequity because the knowledge remains coupled to the
primary expert, and requires the latter’s continuous management.
Reinhardt (2011) discusses knowledge transfers from the
perspective of service, training and collaboration; service involves
the transfers of knowledge and information from entities produc-
ing that knowledge to external clients, training focuses on the
expert training of peer scientists or technicians, while collabora-
tions involve the establishment of mutual beneﬁts, usually among
actors located in different industries, but with a shared interest in
deploying speciﬁc techniques or expertise.
While the framing of knowledge diffusion/circulation by Harris
and Reinhardt are both applicable to the case considered here, the
perspectives offered are only partial because neither of the
frameworks could sufﬁciently explain how nuclear knowledge
transfer contributed to instantiating the scientiﬁc values and
practices of an emergent nation, nor how a recipient nation such as
Malaysia, having entered late into scientiﬁc modernity, could catch
up without sacriﬁcing their intellectual independence while
reclaiming epistemic agency in the process.1
The model of knowledge transfer that will be proposed is not
concerned with the direct beneﬁts of knowledge diffusion between
parties and how to accrue these advantages. Rather, the model
intends to address the transitional phases that inﬂuence and
impact the epistemic attitudes of a state actor or institutional entity
when the latter evaluates and re-evaluates its science and tech-
nology policies and knowledge process in relation to its identity
and position within a global technoscientiﬁc exchange. Moreover,
science and technology in service of bread-and-butter issues and
the public good (Gwynne, 2011) or public interest (Carrier, 2011)
will affect how science attains social legitimation and authority in
developing nations such as Malaysia. Carrier points to two worries
associated with the politicisation and commercialization of the
scientiﬁc enterprise: the selection and establishment of a research
agenda, and the testing and conﬁrmation procedures of science. He
is concerned with how short-term agendas driven by politics and
commerce, rather than honest inquiry, could turn morally and
epistemically repugnant.
In addition, the seeming preference for applications-based or
development-driven research by developing nations was encour-
aged by the same developed nation waxing lyrical over the
importance of basic research, as emphasis was put on transferring
knowledge considered as fulﬁlling developmental goals rather than1 I will not enter into a discussion concerning the position and interaction of
indigenous or local scientiﬁc knowledge forms with ‘imported’ western science.
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ported’ science did not come pre-packaged with easily transferable
scientiﬁc traditions; and the pressures of catching up in the age of
globalization are greater than the ability tomaintain a disinterested
stance when funding is precarious and the timely production of
results is required for the research to receive continuing support.
One such compromise that Malaysia has to make is encapsulated in
Carrier’s suggestion that doing research in the context of science
application does not diminish the epistemic quality of the science;
what is required is the instituting of checks for maintaining
accountability.2
Therefore, this article advances a model of knowledge transfer
that represents how a still economically developing state actor,
which is Malaysia in this case, could move from epistemic depen-
dence to increasing independence in the production of tech-
noscientiﬁc knowledge. Such a model is only applicable to
epistemic state actors that have arisen as a result of 1) postcolonial
reorganisation 2) enculturation of different epistemic systems,
even if the state actor had neither undergone geographical recon-
ﬁgurations nor been a recipient of colonial interventions, stemming
from major epistemological (and intellectual) shifts as an outcome
of the modernisation project.3
The generalizability of a model at a macro level does not pre-
clude micro-level adjustments to ﬁt the different narratives of en-
tities sharing intersecting characteristics. Moreover, outright
generalizability becomes difﬁcult when one has to attend to a
plurality of contextual circumstances evoked by a single concept.
For instance, doing research in the context of application could just
as much mean, within certain social contexts, the integration of
native/indigenous knowledge with modern ‘western’ science in
scientiﬁc research, as much as imply, a privileging of applied sci-
ence over pure science or curiosity-driven research.
The most proximate knowledge transfer model (from a science
policy perspective) that takes on a three-tier/three-phase structure
is the RIU (Research, Integration, Utilization) model, referenced
above (Böcher & Krott, 2016), that considers how science and policy
stakeholders could interact, and what both sides could do to opti-
mise and maximise communication and understanding to ensure
the successful transfer of science and technological knowledge to
political actors with the most power to deploy that knowledge
towards public good. However, the model is limited to an exami-
nation of closed systems (such as knowledge transfers taking place
among entities within the same nation state). Further, the model
focuses on the pragmatic motivation behind knowledge transfer of
states that are already scientiﬁcally well heeled, in contradistinc-
tion to the proposed model’s intent at unpacking conditions that
drive the pragmatic and utilitarian impetus of states that are still
catching up scientiﬁcally, or lacking in scientiﬁc pedigree and
capital.
Therefore, the proposedmodel, abbreviated to ETTLG: epistemic
transition, epistemic transplantation and localisation, as well as
epistemic generation, extends beyond the RIU model by scaling up
the multiple forms of knowledge transfer between different cate-
gories of allies across international (and transnational) political and
technoscientiﬁc timelines. These allies could be internal to the
sciences (whether within the same or different scientiﬁc disci-
plines) or external agents (involving interactions betweenvis pure science distinction that could be considered within the development of
Malaysia’s nuclear science and technology programme, but that is another topic
best discussed in a different essay.
3 Modernisation is used in a general sense here, and not for characterising a
speciﬁc cultural period.
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well as individual communities and entities in governments).
The ﬁrst phase, epistemic transition, began from the late 1950s
until 1970; this phase was characterised by pre-industrial moder-
nity and postcolonial reforms as Malaya (before it becameMalaysia
in 1963) wrested back control of a newly reconstituted state (pre-
viously made up of different Malay kingdoms); the nation went
from epistemic exclusion to gradual inclusion through increasing
epistemic autonomy and international political recognition. This
period coincided with a global campaign for the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons (of which Malaya was actively involved via
the United Nations), the establishment of the Atoms for Peace
program and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as
well as international expansionism through developmental aids
and technical assistance. Technological infrastructures underwent
consolidation for national development, and socio-economic col-
laborations were formed with the establishment of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The end of this phase was
signalled by Malaysia joining the IAEA as a member state (Member
States j International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.), marking the start
of its involvement in developing nuclear knowledge.
The second phase, epistemic transplantation and localisation,
which developed from the 1970s until the late 1980s, represented
knowledge transfer as a two-prong process: the transmission of
blackboxed nuclear technological knowledge and other generic
scientiﬁc knowledge through technical assistance and gifts-as-aids
(in the form of books, journals, technical manuals, etc.) intended for
local infrastructural and capacity building. The transmission of
blackboxed knowledge, which is knowledge transmitted from
donor to recipient without the latter having access to the mecha-
nism that produced said knowledge, was through ‘approved’
technical information. In terms of nuclear technology, much of the
knowledge transferred in the 1970s, and the ﬁrst part of 1980s,
could be conceived as operational knowledge since facilities for
experimental research were not available until the early 1980s.
Further, the transmission of nuclear technologies was proportional
to the rate of economic development of the still industrializing
states.
Nevertheless, these low level technological transfers were
complemented by basic science research taking place in Malaysian
campuses across the physical and life sciences; there were small-
scale ventures into fundamental nuclear physics research by the
early 1980s. Capacity building involved producing caches of local
scientists with PhDs through the Malaysian government scholar-
ships and Colombo plan.4 Technical assistance came not only from
more developed countries but also from neighbouring ASEAN
countries, such as Indonesia, who was one of the earliest adopters
of nuclear technology in the region. A national agency was estab-
lished to facilitate technology transfer at the level of inter-
governmental agencies, with assistance from the IAEA.
The third phase, from the late 1980s until the present time, is a
period when extant intellectual capital of the state is maintained
while preparations are made towards the attainment of greater
self-sufﬁciency. I refer to this phase as epistemic generation,
although reliance on expertise for higher-order scientiﬁc knowl-
edge transfer continues. This phase has increased peer-level bi-
lateral collaborations (instead of unilateral transfers from more
scientiﬁcally and technologically advanced donor states) between
Malaysian and overseas scientiﬁc institutions; this is done by
building up knowledge that draws on the affordances provided by4 Information for this had been obtained from interviews with scientists who
were recipient of scholarships under one of the plans, as well as from the records
provided by the Rockefeller Archives Centre. See Ford Foundation, 1962e1964.
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equipment for R&D. The national nuclear agency continues to
mediate the transfer of nuclear technologies to industry. Projects
with immediate practical utility are often preferred over riskier
ones.
After decades of being non-committal, 2016 became the year
when the Malaysian government was making serious efforts to-
wards the appropriation of nuclear power; its nuclear power
infrastructure development had already been assessed by the IAEA
at the time of writing (Chatzis, 2016; Liew, 2016). How Malaysia
might be a strategic and important polycentre of applied nuclear
research remains to be seen, as are its attempts at contributing to
epistemic generation. Moreover, there is need for further contem-
plation over whether Malaysia would continue with a mode-2
research programme driven by science in the applied context,
although one could argue that the distinction from basic or mode-1
research is superﬁcial (Nordmann, Radder, & Schiemann, 2011). The
Institute of Physics Symposium in 1976, and the ﬁrst Asia-Paciﬁc
Physics Conference in 1983 (Arima et al., 1984), both held in
Singapore, saw Malaysian physicists presenting on their work in
theoretical and basic science research in both nuclear and particle
physics, regardless of the national emphasis on science for devel-
opment (Alvares & Sachs, 2010, pp. 245e247; 250e252).
However, it must be noted that the three phases could not be
parcelled out into neat timelines; overlaps are inevitable. The
longue durée of Malaysian nuclear science and technological
development is characterised by recurrent aspects of earlier phases
within the later phases of its development since a transition re-
quires one to revisit accumulated legacies prior to deciding on the
next move. The development of the nuclear programme is an
outcome of the evolution of Southeast Asia’s nuclear tech-
noscientiﬁc polycentres that have emerged out of several contin-
gencies: the ‘superpowers’ desire to form alliances with, and gain
political support from, emerging nations; anxiety over the future of
energy resources to meet demands of national progress; as well as
political survival and security. The transfer of nuclear technology
for non-proliferation purposes into Southeast Asia forms the
earliest instance of a large-scale technoscientiﬁc knowledge
transfer frommore developed states (of the North) to emerging and
developing nation states (of the South) following the SecondWorld
War; such knowledge ﬂows form the ﬁrst recognizable instance of
technoscientiﬁc diplomacy that conﬁgures the history of nuclear
science and technology as one that is ultimately transnational and
international. Therefore, technoscience in this case signiﬁes the
coupling between science as the knowledge source and technology
as the harnessing of that knowledge for socio-technical engineer-
ing. The next section offers up three arguments on the rationale
behind the technoscientiﬁc knowledge transfer discussed.
2. Rationalizing technoscientiﬁc knowledge transfer
The ethics of prioritarianism in pursuit of development and
distributive justice informs the sensibilities of the national tech-
nocratic regime desiring the ﬂow of technoscientiﬁc knowledge
from what seems to be epistemically richer centres to the periph-
ery. The pursuit of such knowledge transfer is underpinned by a
need for political legitimization, countering agnotology (igno-
rance), and social engineering through science and technology di-
plomacy. These arguments inform the postcolonial imperatives for
uplifting the morals, spirits, and intellect of a nation depleted of
dignity from long-term imperialism.5 The ﬁrst and third arguments5 While there were publications that came from the nationalist movements and
colonial social uplift societies, I will not address them here.
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and global studies, political science, sociology, economics, and the
historical studies of Malaysia, while the second argument is given
scant attention. Even as there exists state imposed agnogenesis, the
focus here will be on the strategies the state deploys to combat
agnotology in the fulﬁlment of its technocratic goals.
Knowledge transfer as political legitimation is a necessary move
by an incumbent government seeking legitimation by publicising
its attempts at improving the social and economic levels and sta-
tuses of its citizens, especially segments of citizens that make up
the backbone of the incumbent’s political support. In Malaysia’s
case, political legitimation is crucial for countering criticisms con-
cerning how the incumbent rose to power as a result of a bargain
struck between the outgoing British administrators and their
approved Malayan political parties in order to maintain British in-
terest (White, 2004); therefore, the incumbent’s best way of
attaining legitimation is by ameliorating scarcity and deprivation.
As higher-level science and technology training ramped up from
the late 1950s, a technocratic state was born out of a need to
manage infrastructures and commodities and develop labour
capability, with strategies as outlined in the First Malaysian Plan of
1966e1970. By 1970, the technocratic mission has become ﬁrmly
established, with a single line from the National Principles of
Malaysia declaring the state’s unequivocal goal in “building a pro-
gressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and
technology” (Rukunegara, 1970; Rukun Negara: guiding or
forgotten principles, 2004).
The technocrat6 could be elucidated through a triangulation
between society (the public), government, media, and scientists
within the conﬁgurations of science, technological innovation, and
ethical discourse (Bucchi, 2009). In the case of Malaysia, the for-
mation of the technocrat could be historicized by locating its gen-
esis at the intersection of its colonial intellectual heritage (and
introduction to modern western technoscience) and a postcolonial
appropriation of that heritage in the service of nation building.
Moreover, the simultaneous development of a national scientiﬁc
council and industry action plan in the 1970s produced strategies
for creating linkages between basic/laboratory sciences of the
public universities and industry, although this does not often
translate well in practice due to the amount of legitimacy, juris-
diction, and control government agents have over the other sectors.
Nevertheless, the innovation strategies, the distribution of seed
funding, and political interests in developing particular commu-
nities of entrepreneurs by the Malaysian technocratic leadership
between the 1970s and the 1990s (Felker & Jomo,1999) enabled the
national nuclear science and technology agenda to work hand in
glove with its industrialization project.
Knowledge transfer for countering agnotology7 could be
considered through two instances.8 The ﬁrst instance relates to
breaking a culture of ignorance stemming either from the failure of6 The technocrat also embodies the expert and expertise, the latter signiﬁed by
tacit knowledge and meta-expertise. Meta-expertise can be applied to groups of
policy makers and decision-makers controlling the funding or support of science
programmes, and who may, or not, be practicing scientists/technologists. However,
a proper discussion of expertise is not within the scope of this article. See (Collins &
Evans, 2007) and (Collins, 2016) for discussions on the issue.
7 For those interested in learning more about the root meaning of the term,
Robert Proctor provides a thoroughgoing explication in his introductory chapter to
Agnotology: the Making and Unmaking of Ignorance.
8 Agnotology, in the context of this article, is deﬁned as ignorance stemming from
certain social-epistemological conditions and/or choices. However, that deﬁnition
of ignorance is relative to the kinds of knowledge that matter to the community
judging their value; hence, negative knowledge in some epistemic (and even
ontological) matters, to borrow a term of Knorr-Cetina, might not concern certain
communities for whom deﬁcit in these knowledge areas is not considered a loss.
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deprivation/ﬁltering out of said knowledge; in either case, an
epistemic deﬁcit requires rectiﬁcation through long-term training
programmes to reduce reliance on external expertise and to
encourage knowledge generation by local knowledge/scientiﬁc
communities. However, the encouragement of one form of
knowledge does not translate into an overall resolution of igno-
rance, as the state is most interested in targeting knowledge areas
that could contribute most immediately to fulﬁlling its goals of
progress and development. Further, the state has to ensure that the
process of knowledge diffusion among its citizenry will shore up its
legitimacy rather than undermine its authority; while the incum-
bent government has not been known to crack down on any form of
technoscientiﬁc knowledge, it has become much more prosecuto-
rial over knowledge that represents, even if superﬁcially, an op-
position to its ideology and method of governance (Brown, 2007).
However, that does not mean that all forms of scientiﬁc research
were given equal standing, for the state’s practice of prioritarianism
ensures the privileging of certain knowledge types over others. If
military funding in the US had produced agnogenesis by advancing
certain knowledge areas while allowing other areas to languish
(Proctor, 2008), the same could be said about Malaysia’s R&D pol-
icies. On the other hand, the aspiration towards epistemic gener-
ation is deﬁned within the second instance of knowledge transfer
for confronting agnotology, especially in the case when the
knowledge transferred is blackboxed and derived from a larger
body of knowledge hidden to those outside the inner circle of
production; the recipients of the blackboxed knowledge reproduce
the practice of secrecy during the epistemic generation phase, in
belief that this would provide them an edge in a competitive
economy.
At the same time, technoscientiﬁc progress does not erase
ignorance, because agnotology could still be propagated through
technocratic policing that narrow inquiries to knowledge seen as
immediately translatable to a national developmental agenda,
thereby creating situations where scientiﬁc and technical knowl-
edge was only partially and incompletely transmitted. Moreover,
the complex history of the scientiﬁc knowledge that could provide
more background to the political and social nature of that knowl-
edge was neglected during the process of transmission. In the end,
recipients of said knowledge found themselves unable to respond
more critically to the transmitted knowledge, which has the effect
of hindering creativity and innovative thinking when it comes to
intervening at a more foundational level. Agnotology is prevalent in
postcolonial societies dependent on the transfer of scientiﬁc
knowledge that were only partial transfers of expertise, especially
when they were precluded from direct involvement in the creation
of such knowledge (what Collins and Evans refer to as contributory
expertise), and therefore, discouraged from deepening their
knowledge acquisition to a more foundational level, especially if it
is in the service of scientiﬁc curiosity.
Knowledge transfer as social engineering, and science and
technology diplomacy, require the charting of internal and external
factors and policies that position Malaysia along the contours of a
world scientiﬁc system of a state that has gone from being a least
developed country (LDC) to a second-tier newly industrialized one
(NIC)9 (Jomo, 1993). This is where Polanco’s (1992) concept of short
and long term movements in world-science (which he refers to as
short time and long time) modelled after Braudel’s world-economy
system could be useful for structuring the timeline of Malaysia’s9 One of the concerns over Malaysia pertains to its ability to move out of the
middle-income trap towards the production of higher value-added services and
goods (Hutchison, 2016).
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instability and constant ﬂuctuation given Malaysia’s continuing
prevarication over how far to gowith its nuclear programme, which
conditions its investment into developing the required infrastruc-
ture and human resources. The world-science system is the
embodiment of an epistemically charged longue durée explication
of Malaysia’s zones of technoscientiﬁc centres and the stages
involved in the development of the nation’s technoscientiﬁc
agenda.
One example is seen in the alignment between scientiﬁc
research and industrial technological needs. According to Felker
and Jomo (1999), the reform of the innovation system in Malaysia
from the late 1980s until the 1990s saw an integration of science
and technology with industries to “create a Japanese-style, ‘de-
mand-driven’ technology infrastructure focused on applied
research and guided by speciﬁc sectoral needs; in contrast to an
‘American-style’ science-push system emphasising basic R&D and
driven by academic curiosity or bureaucratic priorities” (p. 21). The
pragmatist inclinationwas as much about putting resources behind
projects with potentially quicker turnover as it was about
attempting to become one of the centres of new technoscientiﬁc
capital. A more concrete example of how interventions from
external and international bodies have shaped the formation of
Malaysia’s technocratic valuation of science and technology is
through consideration of Malaysia’s relationship to the Atoms for
Peace project, and its continual reliance on the IAEA for material
and expert support. The kind of knowledge that was transferred
would diffuse into the development of various sectors (from agri-
culture to medicine), with implications not only on how tech-
noscientiﬁc knowledge was transferred to the citizens, but how the
state proceeded with infrastructural development.
3. Epistemic transition, transplantation, localisation, and
generation (ETTLG)
The ﬁrst phase, which represents epistemic transition, is when
an entity has to undergo a period of cultural adjustment and
reconﬁguration of beliefs and value systems to embrace an
epistemic culture that might seem alien and different fromwhat is
native to the former; this phase requires consideration of circum-
stances conditioning the epistemic violence that alienates a com-
munity from its indigenous knowledge heritage while attending to
how immigration and social assimilation could also render that
heritage unstable. In the case of Malaysia, it also means operating
with a new postcolonial identity that did not pre-exist British
colonialism, all the while considering its relationship to a post-war
world attempting to regain equilibrium.
The epistemic transition began with the establishment of the
University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur as an autonomous campus in
1959, after a decade of being conjoined to the Singapore campus,
and the concomitant establishment of its independent Faculty of
Science (Lim, 2013). The teaching of science began from year one,
starting in the academic year 1959/1960, with laboratory in-
structions held at the Technical College and Victoria Institution (the
latter two being junior colleges) leading to the graduation of the
ﬁrst cohort in 1963 (Lee & Moo, 1977). The growing number of
graduates enabled the Malaysian government to send some of their
promising students abroad for graduate studies by the 1970s; some
returned to staff University of Malaya as well as the other new
public universities that were being established. At a regional level,
the Association of the Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher
Learning had been set up by 1956,10 with its ﬁrst newsletter10 See (The Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning, n.d.).
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the Physical and Natural Sciences was held in Vietnam in 1967
(Ford Foundation, 1961), Malaysia was not, at that time, one of the
participants.11 The seminar included a ﬁeld trip to the Atom Energy
Centre at the University of Dalat, in Vietnam, and therefore, is
indicative of how nuclear science research had taken root in
Southeast Asia.
While the stage was being set at a local level, more politically
advanced international actors with their own agenda seized the
opportunity to intervene just as the national R&D policies of the
emerging nations were being formulated. That was how Malaysia
got started in its nuclear programme through Atoms for Peace. The
programme was conceived to support dissemination of techno-
logical knowledge to emerging nations as a form of science and
technology diplomacy, while keeping the recipient sufﬁciently
dependent. The knowledge source was the US National Labora-
tories, which was instrumental in the development of research
reactors, various radiation counters and detection tools, synchro-
trons, cyclotrons, and accelerators; the work done there prepared
the way for the development of the superbomb programme (York,
1976) that would not remain the exclusive prerogative of the US
(Holiﬁeld, 1985), as well as programmes heralding the beginning of
a practice in classifying scientiﬁc knowledge in the name of na-
tional defence and security.
The Atoms for Peace programme attempted to combat hostility
while also forming allies through the careful knowledge diffusion,
which inadvertently spread the culture of secrecy to beneﬁciary
societies undergoing epistemic transitions, a culture that would
then be localized in the beneﬁciaries’ nuclear programmes. Galison
(2010) details the rise of US’s Atomic Energy Act, ﬁrst ratiﬁed in
1946 to control how information pertinent to technological
advancement in nuclear physics could be disseminated, amidst the
protests of scientists. Therefore, anyone who “communicates,
transmits, or discloses restricted data with the intent to injure the
United States or secure advantage to a foreign nation could be
punished by death or life imprisonment. Anyone who moves the
restricted data with ‘reason to believe’ that their communication,
transmission, or disclosure will injure the United States or secure
advantage to a foreign nation could face up to 20 years in jail and/or
up to a $20,000 ﬁne” (p. 952). However, over the next eight years,
declassiﬁcation proceeded gradually, so that advances in nuclear
instrumentation, mathematical techniques, accelerators, reactors,
and nuclear medicine became more accessible. By the 1950s,
Congressional hearings led to a signiﬁcant revision of the act in
1954 that allowed partial exchanges with foreign countries while
liberalizing certain patent provisions that coincided with the
establishment of the Atoms for Peace programme in 1954, a pro-
gramme that Krige (2006) refers to as a “polyvalent policy
initiative”.
According to Osgood (2006) and Krige (2006), the Atoms for
Peace is a programme that aimed to control public sentiments
regarding the national nuclear weapons programme while dealing
with anti-communism paranoia (a paranoia that also beset much of
Southeast Asia at the time); the programme coincided with the
Eisenhower administration’s need to curtail nuclear stockpiling by
the Soviet bloc by encouraging, on the surface, the use of ﬁssible
materials from available uranium stockpile for peaceful purposes.
In actuality, Eisenhower was engaged in one of the most massive
weapons build-ups in US (perhaps even world) history. At the time
he took ofﬁce, the US had only 841 nuclear weapons. By the end of
his presidency, it was estimated that the number had gone up to11 The participants were institutional representatives from Singapore, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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the bomb Bravo, which vaporized three islands of the Bikini Atoll in
Marshal Islands and produced in its wake civilian casualties out of
the Japanese tuna ﬁshing boat, Lucky Dragon Five, had contributed
to the US impetus in propagating the nuclear-peace programme.
Having directly experienced the destructive potential of thermo-
nuclear weapons, and fearing competition from other emerging
nations and the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower administration
decided that controlled diffusion of nuclear knowledge was the
best safeguard.12 One could read this as a form of epistemic locking-
in, laying down for state actors of emerging nations the parameters
of their science and technology policies while discouraging their
emulation of the same scientiﬁc practices and cultures that had
enabled the generation of the nuclear technology in the ﬁrst place.
Therefore, by dictating the terms of science and technology policies
of these newly independent and emerging states, the industrial-
ized/former imperialists were effectively abrogating the epistemic
sovereignty of these new nations. This would be the attitude un-
derlying much of science and technology diplomacy from more
advanced states to recipient states.
The Atoms for Peace programme that went hand in glove with
the Eisenhower Administration’s psychological warfare saw the
establishment of the US Information Agency, and the transmission
of books and other reading materials steeped in American values to
identiﬁed recipients (Barnhisel, 2010), includingMalaysia.With the
Atoms for Peace programme in place by 1954, and the IAEA set up
by 1957, the process of organizing what to classify and declassify
was underway, beginning from 1955 with the ﬁrst Geneva Summit,
one intimately documented by Laura Fermi in Atoms for the World.
The 1955 summit was supposed to represent the starting point of
the superpowers’ ofﬁcial act of disseminating declassiﬁed infor-
mation. Eisenhower became the ﬁrst president to test a pool-type
reactor: this pool-type reactor was later relocated to Wuer-
enlingen in Switzerland (United States Atomic Energy Commission,
1958; Chastain, 1958).
The second Geneva conference in 1958 about doubled in size
(from 3600 to 6300 strong in the number of attendees), and the
initially classiﬁed results pertaining to thermonuclear reactions
were also revealed for the ﬁrst time. The US technical exhibits
included full-size operating laboratory devices with two operating
reactors, a computer facility, a radioisotope laboratory, a hydrogen
bubble chamber, a whole-body radiation counter, and seven oper-
ating devices for research into thermonuclear reactions. Many
technical exhibits and informational materials on display were
prepared as publicity materials to demonstrate the US’s nuclear
diplomatic goals (United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1958).
The 1950s saw the US occupying a lead position where nuclear
technology was concerned (Cartwright, 1978). By the time of the
second Summit, the TRIGA (Training, Research, Isotope Production,
and General Atomic) reactor, also a pool-type reactor but touted as
safer than previous generations of pool-type reactors, was already
developed. This reactor would play a big role in nuclear techno-
logical transfer and transplantation to developing countries such as
Malaysia.
Edward Teller, Freeman Dyson, and a group of young physicists
designed the TRIGA reactor in the summer of 1956 for their friend
Frederick Hoffman’s newly established company, General Atomic.
The new reactor design was meant to replace the usual reactor
design inﬂuenced by the submarine-propulsion reactor pro-
gramme under Admiral Rickover. Most importantly, the reactor was
designed for operation by institutions and technicians without12 The Russians also conducted their version of the Atoms for Peace programme
among socialist states, but that will not be discussed here.
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2015). Incidentally, Teller had a major role as scientist-advocate for
nuclear science in the Atoms for Peace programme that included
advocating for the deployment of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia,
exempliﬁed by his 1975 lecture tour in Bandung, Indonesia (Teller,
1977). This was boosted by both the US’s and other developing
nation’s anxiety over existing oil reserves, one spurred by a doc-
trine that equates socio-economic progress with ever-increasing
energy consumption. The relation between energy and economic
development is a constant point of anxiety for states grappling with
the problem of ﬁnite energy resources to this day.
While assimilating the values of more advanced state actors, the
transitioning state actors still have agency over what values they
choose to identify with, although one could contest how much of
that agency is possible. Since becoming a member of the United
Nations Assembly, Malaysia has been active in calling for a ban on
nuclear weapons testing, beginning with the then Deputy Prime
Minister, Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman (Malaya to A-powers: Halt
Tests, 1958, p. 7). In the early 1960s, the Malayan cabinet minis-
ters were protesting nuclear weapons tests and calling for disar-
maments (Anti-nuclear group set up, 1961, p. 9; Malaya’s U.N. Call
to Outlaw Nuclear Weapons, 1961, p. 7). At the same time, Malaya
was interested in the potential of nuclear power even before 1957,
probably because its Southeast Asian neighbours were also nego-
tiating their own nuclear power plants (Malaya Eyes Nuclear Power,
1957, p. 5). As early as 1955, the (interim) Singapore government
bid for a nuclear research site to be located in Johor, the south-
ernmost state of Malaysia, through the Colombo Plan’s technical
assistance programme (S’pore Bid for A-plant, 1955, p. 1). However,
Malaysia would not make an ofﬁcial commitment over where it
stood when it came to nuclear energy, not even after an ofﬁcial of
IAEA had visited in 1979 to convince the former (Harness N-energy
Malaysia urged, 1979, p. 12). Further, the contradictory statements
of its ministers, as seen in the news articles published between the
1970s and 1980s, indicate the Malaysian government’s vacillation
over the issue, possibly due to negative public reception stemming
from radiation phobia.
With the stage set by epistemic transition, the second phase
involving epistemic translation and localisation began. This in-
volves a controlled transfer of blackboxed scientiﬁc knowledge to
Malaysia via the IAEA, which means that the maintenance of
knowledge obtained from more advanced technoscientiﬁc centres
and adapted to local conditions would be required. The second
phase takes place after the state actor has embedded a set of values
during its transitional phase, and proceeds to operate by that set of
values. Scientiﬁc resources in the 1960s and 1970s came from the
UK and the US, through their donations of textbooks, reference
books, and journals, many of which are still maintained by the in-
stitutions that received them, and representative of the tangible
outcome of knowledge transplantation.13 Galison (2004) argues
that there are two kinds of secrets: one that is subjective, in that the
secrets are “compact, transparent, arbitrary, changeable, and
perishable” while the second category of secrets are objective, or
“diffuse, technical, determinable, eternal, and long-lasting qua se-
crets” (p. 233). At the intersection of these two types of secrets is
the kind of technical knowledge that will not threaten the balance
of power and is therefore safe for propagation.
The blackboxed objective scientiﬁc knowledge consists of
technical knowledge that would only permit recipients of such
knowledge limited access to the ontology of such knowledge. The13 I found that these materials were still stored at the Nuclear Agency of Malaysia,
University of Malaya, and the National University of Malaysia, as each of themwere
early beneﬁciaries of the gifts programme.
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transfer of knowledge, causes the knowledge recipient to remain
dependent. An example is the deployment of SCRAM (Study of Core
Reloads using an Analytical Model) that had been developed in the
US e the version that was eventually deployed for reactor control
by the nuclear agency in Malaysia was developed by a doctoral
student at the University of Pennsylvania e through localisation
that involved minor tweaks (by inputting customised parameters
required by Malaysia’s TRIGA reactor). Even further trouble-
shooting of the code required the help of allies from another nation,
which was Japan in this case (Gui, 1984). Knowledge transfer builds
dependency when implementation is not accompanied by access to
building blocks of that knowledge.
In addition, from the last century up to the beginning of the
twenty-ﬁrst century, technical assistance programmes, aids, and
short-term placements of experts in the recipient countries heavily
inﬂuenced national technoscientiﬁc policies. These aids were either
multilateral or bilateral, depending on the administering agencies
and states. A signiﬁcant portion of the aid came in the form of
technical assistance with the intent of overcoming skills scarcity,
although one might question whether these skills will add to the
advantages of the developing states, or merely feed the interest of
the more advanced states extending such aids. Moreover, as de
Silva (1970) argues, the aid itself could lead to problematic link-
ages with former colonisers, ensure continuing dependency, and
bring in irrelevant training and technologies, as well as create an
outward brain drain from developing to more developed countries
due to incompatibility between the training and demand, if not
better job prospects elsewhere. In other words, the process of
transplantation does not always produce effective localisation if the
agenda of development is externally inﬂuenced, rather than the
result of an organic development. One might suspect that the lack
of generative localisation also stems from a mechanism of knowl-
edge diffusion that blackboxed the fundamentals of the knowledge.
The mid-1960s involved transplantation of technology and
knowledge in a manner that is piece-meal and not always effective:
the training of staff did not correlate with the establishment of
facilities and sufﬁcient infrastructural support for putting that
training to an expedient end. The mid-1960s until the end of the
1970s were characterised by an emphasis on technical skills
training for a majority of the workforce. A number of those with
technical training ended up in the private sector, not necessarily
applying the technical training they had received although they
might utilise the skills imparted by that training (Ford Foundation,
1965; Lee & Moo, 1977). The Colombo plan ensured, by the mid-
1960s, that there were Malaysians who could serve in the tech-
nical ﬁelds of medicine, engineering, science and higher education.
However, graduate level training sponsorship was only made
possible with the establishment of the Public Service Department,
beginning from 1970. 14 Both experimental and theoretical scien-
tiﬁc work was in full swing by the latter half of the 1970s (Tan &
Ong, 1976), although existing facilities for experimental work
were poor (Ford Foundation, 1962) and still under construction up
to the 1970s (Hussain, 1977). For instance, by the mid-1980s, in-
frastructures for developing radiation technologies were still
inadequate, despite the application of radiation techniques since at
least 1980, therefore making the transfer of such technologies into
industry difﬁcult (Muslim, 1986). Malaysia also shared with India14 Information relating to the scholarship scheme was obtained from preliminary
interviews with three scientists. At the time of writing, I have yet to obtain the
statistical data requested from the Public Service Department of Malaysia with
regard to the kinds of graduate training that were sponsored under the de-
partment’s scholarship scheme between 1970 and 1990.
Please cite this article in press as: Lee, C. A. L., Nuclear science and tec
knowledge transfer (ETTLG), Studies in History and Philosophy of Sciencthe lack of sufﬁcient provision of reactor infrastructures, such as for
the development of nuclear probes for other nuclear analytical
approaches beyond the conventional neutron activation analysis
(Gangadharan, 1983).
As epistemic localisation took place in the second phase from
the late 1970s up to the 1980s, the Malaysian government’s social
engineering was focused on ensuring that industry’s interest did
not supersede the former’s interest; however, industry’s invest-
ment in technological development, including that by the multi-
national corporations based in Malaysia, was low (Felker & Jomo,
1999). At the same time, there were concerns that a heavy-
handed technocratic state intervention could lead to a “compe-
tence-bottleneck” making hierarchical procedural governance,
meant for ensuring sufﬁcient transparency in the composition of
networks, difﬁcult, as the state may “prevent, delay, or shape in a
speciﬁcally distorted manner” the development of a technological
corridor (a conglomeration of public/private networks). This
“competence-bottleneck” could also contribute to a depreciation of
knowledge, and even elicit resistance from the ﬁrms involvedwhen
state and commercial interests conﬂict (Meyer-Stamer, 1999, p. 45).
The difﬁcult relationship between the state, industry, and the
citizenry is even more pronounced in the case of the nuclear pro-
gramme. The deployment of nuclear technology to manufacturing,
agriculture, food processing, and other forms of applied sciences
intended towards industrial applications were channelled to in-
dustry by way of various agencies, including the national nuclear
agency. Even if much of the knowledge produced involved the
maintenance of an existing epistemic framework of operation, the
government maintains the practice of classifying documents
relating to the nuclear project, or any materials pertaining to the
nuclear programmed a culture of secrecy instituted at the time of
epistemic transition. However, in this case, secrecy is more about
exerting control over information and maintaining political legiti-
macy, although decisions made over what to reveal, and when the
revelation should take place, were aimed at managing public per-
ceptions and expectations. The lack of epistemic transparency,
public understanding of the science, and trustworthy disclosure
from the government, ignited controversies over issues pertaining
to the management of radioactive wastes, such as Bukit Merah in
1985 and the Lynas case this century (both involving the mining of
rare earth metals).
Given that Indonesiawas already the ﬁrst state in Southeast Asia
to have embraced nuclear technology, Malaysia was not the ﬁrst
recipient of the nuclear programme within Southeast Asia.
Indonesia has aworking 250 kW TRIGA reactor since 1965 that was
already upgraded to 1000 kW (Arbie & Supadi, 1995) by the time
the Malaysian delegates visited the country’s nuclear reactor fa-
cility in 1972. The Philippines had another research reactor before
the TRIGA was constructed through the Atoms for Peace pro-
gramme, acquired in 1955 (Bernido, Santos, & Leopando, 2007;
Dera Rosa & Aleta, 1992). Vietnam had a TRIGA MK II research
reactor since 1963, with a Russian core that was since integrated
into that reactor (Ngo& Vu, 2000). Finally, Thailand had a TRIGAMK
III reactor since 1977 (Aramrattana & Busamongkol, 1999). Inci-
dentally, in January 1970, a nuclear energy seminar was held in
Jogjakarta, co-convened by the Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional
(BATAN) and the Direktorat Djenderal Tenaga dan Listrik that
focussed on the development and future prospects of nuclear en-
ergy in Indonesia.15
Tun Dr Ismail’s visit to the Indonesian national atomic reactor in
Bandung in March 1972 (Cheah, 1972) to learn about the potential15 A proceeding has been published by BATAN.
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establishment of CRANE (Centre for the Application of Nuclear
Energy) the same year. In a little less than a decade, the government
announced plans for building a training centre at what became
known as PUSPATI (Pusat Penyelidikan Atom Tun Ismail/Tun Ismail
Atomic Research Centre), with aspirations to produce a new gen-
eration of nuclear workers (Training in Nuclear Know-How for
Workers, 1981, p. 14). The process began by having trainees and
students sent abroad for advanced skills training. The annual report
of PUSPATI noted that nine of its technical employees had received
work-placement training at the Australian Atomic Energy Com-
mission Research Establishment (AAEC), three with the Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre (BARC), three with General Atomic, and
four with the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institution (JAERI)
(Puspati, 1981, pp. 1e80).
In addition, four more were locally trained in locations such as
the General Hospital of Kuala Lumpur, the Institute of Medical
Research, and Malaysia’s Metrological Services. By 1983, Malaysia
was already playing host to an international conference on the
effective utilization and management of nuclear reactors
(Proceedings of the Seminar on the Effective Utilisation and
Management of Research Reactors, 1983). Most of the technical
assistance from that period concentrated on safeguards
(Pathmanathan, 1978; United States Department of State, 1987);
PUSPATI was concerned with radiation measurements of nuclear
fallouts from thermonuclear weapon tests elsewhere, and also in
locating the best site for the establishment of its national reactor
site. Even today, Malaysia has a centre in Pahang for measuring
radionuclide no. 42 activity, while also offering technical support
for the veriﬁcation of fallouts stemming from thermonuclear
weapon tests.16
The ﬁrst nuclear science faculty was established at the National
University of Malaysia (UKM) in 1980 (Program Sains Nuklear, n.d.).
A TRIGA Mark II, operating at 1 MW, was obtained through an
agreement signed between the Malaysian government, the US
government, and the IAEA on 22 Sept 1980,17 more than a year after
the signing of an agreement with General Atomic. Since a proper
site to house the reactor was not completed until the end of 1981,
the reactor could not be commissioned until June 1982. The ﬁrst
ﬁssion-chain criticality was achieved in June 28, 1982.18 To legislate
the operation of all facilities or installations connected to nuclear16 Information was obtained from a circular sent out by the Nuclear Agency of
Malaysia to National University of Malaysia (UKM) in April 21, 2016.
17 Although the reactor was purchased, the accompanying enriched uranium was
received as a gift. This was noted in the information circular 287 of the IAEA and a
short news item ($11,000 gift for atom centre, 1980). There could be either a
misprint on the headline or body of the article, as the article refers to the grant as
$110,000, which is a sizeable amount. The agreement between the agency and the
IAEA as laid out in the circular stipulated that the US would supply approximately
24.76 kg of uranium isotope-235 enriched to approximately 19.9% by weight as fuel
rods and 7.6 g of uranium isotope-235 enriched to approximately 93% by weight for
use in the neutron detectors. The transfer of uranium appears to be of the value of
$50,000 per annum, which would mean that the $110,000 is the more plausible
number if the transfers were being made in instalments. As stated in Article V of the
circular (The Text of the Agreement of 22 September 1980 Concerning the Agency’s
Assistance to Malaysia for the Establishment of a Research Reactor Project, 1983)
which lists out the payment made by the Malaysian government for the estab-
lishment of the research reactor project, the Malaysian government appeared to
have paid for the purchase of the TRIGA Mark II reactor from General Atomic with
facilitation by the IAEA.
18 The Philippines also acquired the TRIGA in the same decade as Malaysia,
although it had acquired a research reactor of a different kind in 1963. Its TRIGA
reactor has since been decommissioned.
19 At the time of writing, in preparation for Malaysia’s possible investment in
nuclear energy, work is underway to update the legislature governing the
deployment of nuclear technology that would include safeguards for nuclear power
plants.
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1984.19 Given the pervasive conception of science and technology
as handmaidens of development, there was still not much political
motivation, up until the early 1990s, to develop scientiﬁc in-
frastructures that encouraged R&D in basic nuclear science
research, even if that did not translate to no scientists doing such
research.20 Further, due to the imbalance between available
expertise and infrastructures to support the development of that
expertise, it was not uncommon for many scientists returning to
Malaysia to ﬁnd that they had to deploy the skills developed within
their original area of research in another ﬁeld more readily avail-
able in Malaysia.
By the mid-1980s, an intensiﬁcation of research in priority areas
(IRPA) scheme was established under the ﬁve-year, 1986e1990
Fifth Malaysian Development Plan, with the Nuclear Energy Unit’s
research programme prominently featured in this plan. In 1988, the
Malaysian government spent MYR 4.87 mil, followed by MYR 4.02
mil in 1989, and MYR 3.75 mil in 1990, the last amount repre-
senting a decrease in government funding. If the agricultural and
industrial sector set out on almost equal footing, much of the
resource allocation went to industrial programmes by 1990, with
static amounts dedicated to nuclear medicine and also an
increasing amount dedicated to strategic programmes (what
exactly they are is not stated in the document). Interestingly, the
report on the IRPA scheme was already criticising the bureaucratic
requirements of grant applications for slowing down the progress
of science as scientists had to spend an inordinate amount of time
writing grant applications every year for a mere pittance (Unit
Tenaga Nuklear, 1990).
The setting up of the IRPA scheme coincided with the govern-
ment’s Look East policy; by the second half of the 1980s, Malaysia
was turning to Japan for the acquisition of technological knowl-
edge, although a trade agreement had been established with Japan
since the early 1960s (Unit Teknologi Nuklear, n.d.). Therefore,
when Singapore hosted the aforementioned ﬁrst Asia-Paciﬁc
Physics conference, it was organized with leadership from the
Japanese physics community. The papers from the proceedings
illustrate Malaysian physicists’ attempt at participating in as near
an equal footing as possible, even if the projects they were working
on involved small-scale calculations and problem solving, and
seemed relatively unambitious from a global standpoint.
Despite the existence of local scientiﬁc journals since the 1970s,
the publication quality was largely sophomoric, with profession-
alization happening only towards the end of the 1980s. The na-
tional nuclear agency, which underwent a few name changes from
CRANE to PUSPATI to Nuclear Energy Unit to theMalaysian Institute
for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) before settling intowhat it
is today, the Malaysian Nuclear Agency, publishes its own in-house
journal, Jurnal Nuklear Malaysia, covering topics of interest to the
local nuclear science and technology community. The establish-
ment and growth of the nuclear programme through infra-
structural construction, reactor commissioning, methods of
informational dissemination, and the embedding of nuclear tech-
nology and knowledge within the agenda of national development,
signify epistemic transplantation and localisation.
The third phase of epistemic generation for Malaysia’s nuclear
programme is mostly concentrated at the intra-state level, or20 Local science journals from between the late 1970s until the 1980s indicated
that there were attempts to do foundational research in the physics of another area
close to nuclear science, particle physics, despite there being no facilities whatso-
ever for doing experimental work in the area. Malaysia was also not a direct
participant at CERN until it became a part of the CMS collaboration in 2013 (in-
formation obtained from private communication with Malaysia’s Academy of
Science).
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involved; nuclear knowledge moves from the research institution/
nuclear agency/and even university departments to both public
and commercial sectors. This is when efforts at eradicating
epistemic dependency and agnotology become serious. Although
serious efforts are made towards the production of own technolo-
gies, there is still some dependency on foundational knowledge
from other polycentres of nuclear research. At the same time,
Malaysia’s nuclear programme strives to be competitive in the
development of nuclear technologies for industry, health, agricul-
ture, hydrology, environment, and solid waste treatment. One could
consider the third phase as having developed, albeit in a veryminor
way, since the 1980s. Even as nuclear knowledgewas in the process
of being localized, initiatives were taken to transfer that knowledge
beyond the conﬁnes of a closed group of recipients in minor ways,
through early versions of public science communication. For
instance, there were proposals for building a quiz board using the
equivalent of a hobby kit setup (Rashid & Khair, 1984) and the
construction of an electronic physical model of a neutron chain-
reaction of three generations that included the use of sound ef-
fects generatedwith a tape recorder (Rashid,1982); these proposals
are proto versions of today’s maker culture doubling as education
outreach. Technocrats continue to forecast the potential of nuclear
technologies and nuclear energy for Malaysia, even as other tech-
nologies are being developed.21
One of the national nuclear programme’s achievements was the
establishment of a multipurpose gamma irradiation plant for R&D
and industry use (one that exceeds a lower capacity 1977 version
from an Australian manufacturer of healthcare products, Ansell),
with the capacity of two-million Ci or 2000 kCi, using Cobalt-60;
two more gamma ray irradiation facilities of a much lower capac-
ity were built in 1995 and 2010, with expertise continuously being
developed to produce the needed components locally to reduce
expenditure and obtain more control.22 While irradiation of food
produce is becoming a regular practice today, the late 1990s up to
the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century saw intensive campaigns for
the public acceptance of that technology in Malaysia, which also
means transferring knowledge regarding radiation safety to food
producers (Food and Environmental Protection Section, 2001).
Further, there is long-term intention in upgrading the capacity of
the current reactor (of 1 MW) to 20 MW by 2026 (Muhd Yunus,
2013).
Much of the revenue generated at this point had been in con-
sultancies and services, trainings, and commercialization of the
technologies, although the operating costs appear to supersede the
revenues, even up to the projected year of 2030 (Muhd Yunus,
2013), perhaps because Malaysia still requires the transfer of
expert knowledge and technologies from outside of Malaysia and is
not yet at the stage of independently adding value. Now that
Malaysia is moving towards the construction of its own nuclear
power plants, it aspires to be a hub for dissemination of nuclear
information and technical support provision. The supply of nuclear
power, and expertise pertaining to its maintenance, is a long-term
plan for enhancing the state’s nuclear energy capability (Muhd
Yunus, 2013).
Malaysia’s technocrats are looking into ways for improving local
capacity for supporting the state’s venture into nuclear power
production. Since 2010, the College of Engineering at a private21 There is on-going R&D on solar batteries and electric cars, among others, but I
will not discuss them here.
22 See the Unit Tenaga Nuklear, 1989; Electron Accelerator Application: Gamma-
ray Irradiation Facilities for Commercial Use (including R&D), n.d.; and (Gamma
Irradiator, n.d.).
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of technical elective courses in nuclear engineering and technology
in its Nuclear Engineering Department, with input from Texas
A&M’s University and Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok (Hamid
et al., 2015). However, the demand for such courses is still low,
which could be attributed to their newness, perception of their high
level of difﬁculty (therefore jeopardising the student’s grades), and
not being particularly useful for the job market. Nevertheless, ef-
forts are being made to improve and develop the courses at that
university further, and at the Technological University of Malaysia
(UTM).23
Therefore, the epistemic generation phase is one where the
nation is struggling to deﬁne its place within the production of
technoscientiﬁc knowledge, particularly in terms of what values it
could re-transmit to the global pool of knowledge from whence it
has drawn its epistemic resources. At the same time, one might ask
whether only major contributions to basic science should be priv-
ileged as valuable contributions to technoscientiﬁc developments,
to the exclusion of other forms of inquiries and research that could
produce ﬁndings that provide insight to foundational questions.
This is an important consideration for those supporting scientiﬁc
research in cultures without a long tradition of foundational sci-
entiﬁc inquiries, but who are developing strategies for making
original contributions in such inquiries. Finally, it is crucial to
inquire into the value of a nuclear science programme in contrib-
uting to the technoscientiﬁc infrastructures of a developing state;
will nuclear energy solve the energy crisis of a still-developing
state, or bring about new problems beyond liabilities from
contamination?4. Conclusion
The ETTLG model attempts to theorise the networks of glocal
knowledge, which involve the adaptation of global and universal
forms of knowledge to local conditions as they weave through
different technoscientiﬁc and socio-political landscapes. The
development of the nuclear programme in Malaysia is used as a
detailed case example because its technoscientiﬁc character pro-
vides ample material for amplifying the three developmental
phases articulated by the model while serving as evidence to back
up the claims of the model.
There are three main events in the development of Malaysian
nuclear science and technology programme that are captured
through the three-phase/three-tier structure of the model: the
epistemic transition phase is centred on how the international turn
of events, coupled with the birth of a national modernisation
project, prepared the ground for the establishment of the pro-
gramme and the mobilisation of knowledge (and technological)
transfer; the epistemic transplantation and localisation each
represent a period when the programme was in the process of
taking root, while accounting for local and transnational politics
that produced the operating conditions for knowledge and tech-
nological transfer; the epistemic generation stage takes place when
the programme aspires to greater self-reliance and sustainability,
and to be more generative of technological developments that
could also be sold, or transferred, to other sectors or state actors.
However, the third epistemic stage is still a work in progress as it is
framedwithin still evolving technoscientiﬁc conditions undergoing
epistemic transitions in response to local and global conditions.23 See <https://www.iaea.org/nuclearenergy/nuclearknowledge/Events/2015/
2015-07-28-31-TM-INMA/Presentation/23-Khaidzir-Univ-tekno-Malaysia.pdf>.
Accessed October 27, 2016.
hnology in the Malaysian context: Three phases of technoscientiﬁc
e (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.10.002
C.A.L. Lee / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e1110Nevertheless, the model aims not only to represent the case of
the nuclear programme in Malaysia, but other state actors with
socio-political, economic, and technoscientiﬁc agendas that either
resemble or parallel that of Malaysia. The context of knowledge
transfer involves both macro-level circulation of a technoscience
that might appear neutral from a micro-perspective, yet is depen-
dent on the conditions of institutional politics. The choice of what
technoscientiﬁc knowledge to transfer or circulate outside their
points of origins is never sufﬁciently determined by disinterest-
edness or curiosity, but by the potential for capital, or advantages,
to be gained. Therefore, the form in which the knowledge is
transferred may belie the ideals generating that knowledge in the
ﬁrst place.
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